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THE REGRESSION OF ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION
In the light of the many cu-rent controversies over religious doc-
trine and the administration of church affairs the question of the
jurisdiction of church courts again becomes of interest. It is raised
in the recent New York case of Fiske v. Beatty (1922, Sup. Ct.) 12o
Misc. I, holding that on matters of church discipline the decision of
the ecclesiastical court -is final. Since the relation of church to lay
courts has always evoked some interest, a r6sum6 of the provinces
occupied by the two jurisdictions may not be amiss.
The ecclesiastical courts of old, established by an edict of William
I,' assumed cognizance of three classes of cases: (I) those involving
criminous clerks ;2 (2) those involving matrimonial and testamentary
issues;3 and (3) those involving matters then conceived to be solely of
' About 1O85. A. D. Stubbs, Select Charters (9th ed. 1913) 99.
'It was sacrilege for a layman to put violent hands on the holy person of a
clerk. This jurisdiction was not merely permissive, for the king's court could
require a clerk to be admitted to his purgation. Bracton, f. 124. Even if a clerk
pleaded to the charge and was convicted, he was not to be hung. (1338) Y. B.
11-12 Edw. III (Rolls Series) 598. However, when the ordinary refused to
claim a clerk who had committed sacrilege he was hanged. (1337) Y. B. 12-13
Edw. III (Rolls Series) 68. The clerk must deny the charge to get the benefit
of his clergy. (1302) Y. B. 30-31 Edw. I (Rolls Series) appx. II, 542.
' Matrimonial causes have always been within the jurisdiction of the church
court. There has been some difficulty in determining what cases came under
this general heading. Glanville (circ. 118o) bk. 7, ch. 13, 14. The issue was
raised in the king's court and certified to the bishop, that, "calling before him
them that ought to be called, etc., he diligently inquire of the truth .... and
that he inform the justices of the king .... by his letters patent of what he shall
find on such inquiry." In reply the bishop sent word that "he had caused inquisi-
tion to be diligently made by men worthy of credence and especially well fitted
for the task and bound by an oath" and gave the verdict. Hevinghan; v. Marny
(1312) Y. B. 5 Edw. II (33 Seld. Soc.) 33, Notes, I. See Bracton, f. 3o2. Deci-
sions of lay courts that seem to determine the fact of marriage determine only
reputation thereof. (1294) Y. B. 21-22 Edw. I (Rolls Series) 426; (13o2)
Y. B. 30-31 Edw. I. (Rolls Series) 29o; 2 Pollock and Maitland, History of
English Law (2d ed. 1899) 380. Suits for money promised in consideration of
marriage were good in the ecclesiastical court. Bracton, f. 4o7b. In one case
the church court compelled a clerk to marry a woman with whom he had plighted
his troth and begotten children. Hayward v. Carru (1312) Y. B. 5 Edw. 11 (31
Seld. Soc.) I9o, note. When a husband or wife disseised the other of a thing
owned in common, the offended spouse must have recourse "to the Court of
Christianity that their marriage having been examined either the man be com-
pelled by ecclesiastical censure to support his wife or the wife to return and
follow her husband; and, if it be necessary, let the lord the King on supplication
of the ordinary, execute what is within his province in giving a common enjoy-
ment of the tenement." Bracton, f. 116b. Although ecclesiastical courts could
not grant a divorce, they could find that there was no marriage in fact, and so
reach the same end. (1337) Y. B. IO Edw. III (ed. 1679) 35, pl. 24; Porter's
Case, 3 Cro. Car. (4th ed. 1793) 461. Strictly testamentary matters were like-
wise invariably conceded to belong to the court Christian. (1085) 13 Edw. I,
c. ig; 2 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra, 331-333. The last will was so
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spiritual significance.4 The second and third classes of cases were rigor-
ously limited by the principle that no court should adjudicate a cause in
which it could not effectuate its decree, and, consequently, that only the
king's court could rule upon a lay fee.'
The benefit of clergy was unsuccessfully challenged by Henry II's
Constitutions of Clarendon., But a limitation to the effect that a big-
amous clerk should not have the privilege was imposed in 1276.
7
Thenceforward the benefit of clergy was freely bestowed. In 1350
it was extended to all who could read, irrespective of their religious
character.8 The abuses resulting from this statute continued until the
closely identified with the last confessional that a proper distribution of the
deceased's goods was pro salute animae. Ibid. Actions for a legacy of a debt
confessed [Bracton f. 4o7b], of the usufruct of land [ibid.], of houses and
land in a vill or city [ibid. f. 4o9], of money to be paid from the proceeds of the
sale of land [I Brownl. (1651) 32, or out of leases [ibid. 134], and out of
chattels, lay in the spiritual court which had general supervision of the executor
and of the management of the estate. 2 Burns, Ecclesiastical Law (788) 29.
But in regard to the will the church court merely granted probate. See Bracton,
f. 6o4b, 6I.
"Panton v. Bourne (1312) Y. B. 5 Edw. II (33 Seld. Soc.) 170-172 (right
parson) ; see Brae v. Prior of St. Johns of Jerusalem (1311) Y. B. 4 Edw. II
(Seld. Soc.) i8o, 182; (1304) Y. B. 33-35 Edw. I (Rolls Series) 178 (plenarty of
a church) ; Bracton, f. i8o (corodies) ; Articuli Cleri (1315) 9 Edw. II, st. 4, c. I
(correction of mortal sins, venereal crimes, assaults on the clergy, defalcation,
and pro laesione fidei) ; Bracton, f. 407 (strictly consecrated lands, not frankal-
moigne). They had also a wide jurisdiction for the correction of immoral
conduct. i Holdsworth, History of English Law (3d ed. 1922) 61g.
'Bracton, f. io6 (advowson) ; see (1312-3) Y. B. 6 Edw. II (Seld. Soc.) So;
The Prior of Coventry v. Wald (1311) Y. B. 5 Edw. II (Seld. Soc.) 37;
Bracton, f. 175 (criminal actions). The principal issue determined jurisdiction
(ibid. f. I75), but that of the king's court could not be renounced to the injury
of the king's dignity or the prejudice of another. Ibid. f. 40b. In the matter
of advowsons the king's justices were very strict. It was said that the Pope
ought not to inquire on appeal into matters of dower or inheritance because he
might indirectly judge upon a lay fee. Ibid. f. 3o2b.
a 1164 A. D. See i Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 3, 447-457.
"A clerk who had married twice or married a widow (1276) 4 Edw. I, st. 3,
c. 5; repealed (1547) I Edw. VI c. 12, sec. 16. The issue of bigamy, however,
was tried in the church court. (1344) 18 Edw. III, st. 3, C. 2.
" (1350) 25 Edw. III, st. 3, c. 4. Previously it had been allowed to a boy of
twelve years. (1302) Y. B. 3o Edw. I, (Rolls Series) appx. I, Sio. And to a
woman in 1348. Fitzherbert, Abridgement (circ. 1514) tit. Corone, pl. 461
(whether or not she was a nun does not appear). The liberality of the courts in
this respect is demonstrated by the fact that each accused was customarily given
the same psalm to read. Carter, History of English Legal Institutions (19o2)
247, note 2. Moreover, "altho he have been taught and schooled in the gaol to
know letters and read that shall help him for his life, but the gaoler shall be
punished for it." (156o-1) Dyer (ed. 1794) f. 205b, note; and see (1456) Y. B.
34 Hen. VI (ed. 1679) 49, pl. 6. A vicar who taught a felon to read during his
imprisonment was arraigned for felony but acquitted. (156o-i) Dyer (ed. 1794)
f. 205b, note.
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reformation. 9 But, much as the safety of life and property suffered
from the practice of freeing criminals upon compurgatory oaths, the
king usually profited by confiscating the clerk's chattels.",
The medieval church surrounded the economic institution of mar-
riage with a mystical halo through which the eyes. of a consecrated
churchman only could pierce. 11  It followed that where its laws gov-
erned its courts should adjudicate. Therefore, when the issue of mar-
riage arose in a suit for dower 2 or on a plea of bastardy in a suit for
an inheritance" it was normally submitted to the bishop. The powers
of the courts Christian in this respect and, likewise, in testamentary
The situation is indicated by (1350) 25 Edw. III, st. 3, c. 4, 5, 6, 9, directing
the bishop to make suitable arrangements for dealing with clerks convicted of
treason and felonies, and that indictments against ecclesiastical judges for extor-
tion should state particularly the grounds of complaint. In a century and a half
feeling grew stronger: "detestable persons, lacking grace, wilfully commit
murder ..... in trust to eschew the perils and execution of the law by the bene-
fit of their clergy." (1496) 12 Hen. VII, c. 7. A thief rescued by force on the
way to the gallows was recaptured and, when asked if there was any reason
why execution should not be pronounced upon him, claimed his clergy, which
was granted. (1345) Y. B. ig Edw. III (Rolls Series) 176.
0 If a clerk died before purgation, was hung before the ordinary claimed him,
or if he answered the charge, though judgment was given before he purged
himself, the king took his goods. (292-3) Y. B. 20-21 Edw. I (Rolls Series)
396, note. The king could amerce a clerk according to his temporalities. Bracton,
f. 422b.
Sumner, Folkways (19o6) 395, 414; see 2 Burns, op. cit. supra note 3, 448.
The issue was raised in the king's court. (1340-) Y. B. 14-15 Edw. III
(Rolls Series) 276. Although a very early attempt was made to evade the issue
by holding that a plea that no one knew she was a wife was sufficient [ (1294)
Y. B. 22 Edw. I (Rolls Series) 426, note], the usual plea was "not married"
and the demandant had a right to a writ to the bishop thereon. (1338) 11-12
Edw. III (Rolls Series) 560-562. When two women claimed dower of the same
man's estate, one was to be preferred "upon proof in the ecclesiastical court
which of them is the legitimate wife or, if proof is difficult or if it fails altogether,
then she is to be preferred who was in possession of the husband at the time
of his death." Bracton, f. 94. The latter issue would probably be tried by the
king's court.
'A writ directed the bishop to hold an inquest and determine the fact of
legitimacy (Bracton, f. 419) whereupon the trial proceeded in the king's court.
Ibid. 371. Although one held illegitimate by the church would be considered
illegitimate by the common law, the latter would still hold illegitimate one born
before wedlock, even though the later espousals-of his parents would legitimate
him in the eyes of the church. (1410) Y. B. ii Hen. IV (ed. 1679) 84, pl. 32.
A distinction between the pleas of bastardy and born out of wedlock was made,
and only the former, which involved the question of marriage, was tried in the
church court. Bracton, f. 417 et seq.; (1339-40) Y. B. 13-14 Edw. III (Rolls
Series) 322-326. The latter was tried by the crown. Ennock v. Ennock (1313)
Y. B. 6-7 Edw. II (Seld. Soc.) lO5; Le Fevre v. Sleght, ibid. 158; (1338) Y. B.
11-12 Edw. III (Rolls Series) 350-352; Bracton, f. 416b. In the latter, tfle fact
of marriage was admitted but the time of birth was in dispute. Ibid. f. 216.
Where only reputation of bastardy was tried, suit lay in the king's court. (13o2)
Y. B. 3o Edw. I (Rolls Series) 29o; (1292) Y. B. 2o Edw. I (Rolls Series)
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matters so long as they did not concern lay fee or the king's dignity,
were unquestioned; but when lands were involved the king's courts
were more jealous.'" They also exercised some supervision over the
ordinary. He was answerable for malfeasance;15 and in 1357 corrup-
tion led to the requirement that executors be appointed from the friends
or relatives of the decedent. 6 In 1415 the ordinary was forbidden to
take excessive fees. 7
Heretical crimes were recognized by Bracton5 but their persecution
was not of importance until in the fifteenth century the writ de haere-
tico comburendo was made statutory. 9 Fortunately the orgy of relig-
192 (bastardizing the dead). This phase of ecclesiastical jurisdiction was purely
ancillary. Proceedings to have one judged legitimate could not be there begun
as in a court of first instance. Bracton, ff. 4o4b, 405. Curious decisions were
rendered, such as that where a man returning from a three years' voyage found
a daughter one month old, who was held to be legitimate. (1304) Y. B. 32 Edw.
I (Rolls Series) 62.
"The writ of prohibition, ordering the bishop not to try and the parties not
to litigate a suit in the court Christian was used chiefly in this connection. Brac-
ton, ff. 175, 40Ib, 407, 4o2b, 4o3b (advowson). By the attachment on a pro-
hibition the goods of the bishop and the parties to the suit were attached for
proceeding contrary thereto. Gras v. Houghton. (1312) Y. B. 5 Edw. II (33
Seld. Soc.) 1I8; Clerbeck v. Lincoln (1310-I1) Y. B. 4 Edw. II (Seld. Soc.) 97;
see (1338-9) Y. B. 12-13 Edw. III (Rolls Series) 142; Bracton, f. 4o2; cf.
(1352) 25 Edw. III, St. 3, c. 6.
" (1285) 13 Edw. I, c. 19. See Holdsworth, The Ecclesiastical Courts and
their Jurisdiction, 2 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History (198o) 255,
303.
, (I357) 31 Edw. III, st. I, c. iI.
' (1415) 3 Hen. V, st 2, c. 8.
Bracton, ff. 123b, 124; cf. i Hale, Pleas of the Crown (circ. 166o) 344.
They were rare in England. Bracton, f. I23b (deacon burned for apostasy,
about 1222) ; Maitland, Canon. Law (1898) 158, and The Deacon and the Jewess
(1886) 2 L. QUART. Rav. 153; 2 Prynne Records, 475, 56o.
S(1400) 2 Hen. IV, c. 15. The clergy are said to have previously forged an
act, (1382) 5 Rich. II, St. 2, c. 5, directing the sheriff on certificate from the
bishop to imprison heretics. The statute was repealed. (1552) 5 Edw. VI, c.
12, sec. i. A statute, (1414) 2 Hen. V. C. 7, required the king's court to assist
in apprehending and arresting heretics. Under Henry VIII the act of Henry
IV was repealed and speaking against the Pope or spiritual laws inconsistent with
laws of the realm was no longer a felony. (1533) 25 Hen. VIII c. 14. The Act
of Six Articles made heresy a felony triable in the king's court. (539) 31 Hen.
VIII c. 14; repealed by (547) I Edw. VI c. 12, secs. 3, 4; reenacted by Mary
(554) I & 2 Ph. & M. c. 8; and again repealed by the Act of Supremacy by which
Elizabeth, because she dared not trust too much the churchmen whom she could
not remove at will, turned their jurisdiction over to the Court of High Commis-
sion. (1558) I Eliz. C. i, secs. 17, 18. She did, however, empower the bishop
to imprison heretics, and fine them if they would not abjure. Ibid. The last
execution occurred in 1612. Carter, History of English Legal Institutions (19o2)
231. In Darington's Case, 2 Brownl. (165) 4, a trial for the maintenance of
the opinion of Brownisme, Coke, C. J., said: "that the ordinary by the common
law nor by the statute De Circumspecte Agatis, cannot imprison for any offence,
though it be for Heresie, Schisme, or other erroneous crime whatsoever." The
writ de haeretico comburendo was abolished. (1677) 29 Car. II, c. 9.
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ious persecution on the continent did not spread to England, and
English statutes were comparatively mild. The church took corrective
jurisdiction also of such spiritual offenses as slander, drunkenness,
usury, and those of a venereal nature .2  The jurisdiction of the church
courts in such affairs, moreover, continued until comparatively
recent times.21  Their endeavor to take over all actions involving prom-
ises under oath was, after Henry II, unsuccessful.
2 2
* The preliminary tactical advantage which the church had by reason
of its better organization and the greater completeness of its law was
early overcome by the power of the king's court to grant material
relief. The writ of prohibition and the attachment thereon were instru-
ments with which the common-law lawyers closely circumscribed their
brethren of the church.23 Even the power of excommunication was in
some degree subject to the supervision of the temporal justices.
24
The reformation and the coincident limitation of the jurisdiction of
the courts Christian, while in general identical, may in some part be
attributed to different causes. While the latter would probably have
been brought about independently by the strong ethnocentric instincts of
the English people, we owe the former more to the religious ferment
engendered by the reformation. On the one hand, Henry VIII's sep-
aration from the Pope was the welcome end to centuries of bickering.
On the other, "the doctrinal changes which followed under
" By the statute De Circumsipecte Agatis (1285) 13 Edw. I, st. 4, c. i, sec. 6,
and the Articuli Cleri (315) 9 Edw. II, c. 4, actions for defamation were to be
tried in the spiritual court only when the relief asked was penance corporal; and
only when the defamation was of spiritual nature. 2 Burns, op. cit. supra note 3,
1ig. In 1497 a suit for slander was held a spiritual cause of action although
once judgment was rendered it became matter for the lay court (1497) Y. 13. 12
Hen. VII (ed. 679) 22, pl. 2. That part of a crime of venereal nature which was
temporal was triable in the temporal court, that part which was spiritual, in the
spiritual court, but the injured one could not have both actions. Gallisand v.
Rigaud (27o2) 2 Ld. Raym. 8o9; see Harris v. Hicks (1692) 2 Salk. 548. Battery
on a priest was also punishable in the temporal court. (1497) 22 Hen. VII (ed.
1679) 22, pl. 2. Phillimore v. Machan (1876) L. R. i Prob. Div. 481, held that
(827) 4 Geo. IV, c. 76, abolished ecclesiastical jurisdiction for perjury because
the jurisdiction of the two courts was not concurrent.
"See I Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 4, 620, 622.
"Before Henry II, the church court had cognizance of all actions pro laesione
fidei. 2 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 3, 187-192. But shortly there-
after they were allowed only where the ecclesiastical court, without the oath,
would have had jurisdiction. Glanville (circ. ii8o) bk. X, ch. 22; (2497) 12
Hen. VIII (ed. 1679) 22, pl. 2. And they were subject to prohibition. Ibid.
' See supra note 14.
'An excommunicate had no rights in a court of law. Blaket v. Loveday et
al. (2322) 5 Edw. II (33 Seld. SoC.) 211. Hence it frequently was important
to know whether one had been rightfully excommunicated, and a writ would
issue commanding the bishop to certify as to the fact. (2340) Y. B. 14 Edw.
III (Rolls Series) 156. But (2326) 9 Edw. II st. I, c. 7, provided that the bishop
need not absolve or explain an excommunication unless the libertas regia was
interfered with.
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Edward VI and Elizabeth were an uninterrupted consequence to which
Henry and his parliament more than Once declared themselves utterly
repugnant.
' ' 25
The process of sloughing off the fourteenth century conventionali-
zation of clerical immorality was affected by conflicting, tendencies.
Parliament removed the more serious crimes from the benefit of clergy,26
limited the privilege to one crime, 27 imposed a penalty of one year's
imprisonment 28 and, later, of deportation for seven years,25 on convicted
clergy, and, finally, abolished it altogether.30 But, at the same time,
the courts strained to construe these statutes in favorem vitae and
allowed the widest latitude in the matter of reading.3 '
Under Henry VII's frugal government and Henry VIII's jealous
rule the church courts declined in all respects. The king's courts
gradually took over their jurisdiction in many matters pertaining to
testamentary causes.3 2  Henry VIII abolished appeals to Rome3  and
provided that from the ecclesiastical court appeal lay to the king in
" Taswell-Langmead, English Constitutional History (1875) 369.
'By the beginning of the fifteenth century it was usual to inquire into the
guilt or innocence of the accused clerk before he was sent to the bishop. See
(1399) Bel. (ed. 1869) 99. Then a judgment outrageously against the facts
would be set aside. The following crimes were made non-clergyable: petty
treason, (1496) 12 Hen. VII, c. 7; murder in churches or highways, (1512) 4
Hen. VIII, c. 2; wilful murder, except to clerks in orders, (531) 23 Hen. VIII,
c. I, secs. 3, 4; piracy, (536) 28 Hen. VIII, c. 15 sec. 3; burglary and horse
stealing, (547) I Edw. VI, c. i2, sec. IO; theft from person, (,565) 8 Eliz. c. 4,
secs. 2, 3; rape, (1576) 18 Eliz. c. 7; abduction with intent to marry, (1597)
39 Eliz. c. 9; and stealing clothes or the king's stores, (1671) 22 Can. II, c. 5.
2 (1487) 4 Hen. VII, c. 13 (except for those actually in orders); repealed
(1536) 28 Hen. VIII, c. i, sec. 7; reenacted (547) 1 Edw. VI, c. 12, sec. io.
(576) 18 Eliz. c. 7.
(7,7) 4 Geo. I, c. ii.
"(1827) 7 & 8 Geo. IV, c. 28, sec. 6.
See supra note 8. The statutes were strictly interpreted. If one robbed a
guest in another's house he could have his clergy, for the owner of the house
must be robbed. (156o) Dyer (ed. 1794) f. i83b. A technical error in an indict-
ment would allow the benefit of clergy. Ibid. if. 2olb, I83b. Moreover, a con-
viction of one felony discharged all previous ones; hence if the felon could get
the benefit on his last crime he could escape punishment for the rest. Stone's
Case (1562) ibid. f. 215. The privilege was extended to peers, (I547) 1 Edw.
VI, c. 12, sec. 14; and to women, (1692) 3 W. & M. c. 9, sec. 5, 6. The necessity
for compurgation, (576) i8 Eliz. c. 7 sec. 2, 3, and for reading, (1705) 5 Anne,
c. 6, sec. 6, was abolished. That the religious significance of the privilege was
not entirely forgotten is shown by the fact that while ". . . . a Jew or a Turk
shall not, a Greek or Roman who use not our letters shall have their clergy and
shall stay 'till a book of letters of their country comnes." (I515-1558) B. N. C.
(Marche's trans. 1873) 35. One who was captus oculis might have it if he spoke
Latin fluently. Ibid.
'When the cause was spiritual, but the proceeding in judgment temporal, a
prohibition would issue. See (1340-I) Y. B. X2 Hen. VII (ed. 1679) 22, pl. 2.
Under Edward VI all ecclesiastical processes in causes of testament were required
to be issued in the king's name. (1547) I Edw. VI, c. 2. A mandamus could
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Chancery or to the Court of Delegates.34 By the same statute he
declared the canon law to be good only if not repugnant to the laws of
the realm and that new canons could be made only by royal authority.
The next year the Act of Supremacy35 assumed for the king's court
and commission (later the Court of High Commission) all ecclesias-
tical jurisdiction of importance. The great universities were enjoined
to teach canon law and ecclesiastical jurisprudence;36 and ten years
later married holders of the D. C. L. were permitted to exercise ecclesi-
astical jurisdiction.37  Elizabeth's Act of Uniformity 3s restored to the
king's court the jurisdiction which Mary had taken away.19 An attempt
to revive ecclesiastical jurisdiction in 1682 failed.40  From that time
the powers of the church seem to have remained at a low ebb.
The history of the church courts in England has had only an indi-
rect influence on their position in America.41  The colonists came to
this country to escape the established church of which their religious
organization did not claim to be a part, and they left its system of
courts behind. They seem, however, in many respects to have retained
the conception of the church as an integral part of the state; and it is




On the other hand, when it became a settled governmental policy
to divorce church and state as completely as possible, the courts deter-
mined that they would not try a purely ecclesiastical issue.4 3  But
issue to compel the ordinary to grant probate. Dominus Rex v. Sir Richard
Raynes (1699) Salk. *299. The ecclesiastical court under Charles I could grant
probate of a will of personal effects solely; of lands and goods both, if one
entire will; and of lands alone, but this last was not a matter of right. Netter v.
Brett (1634) Cro. Car. (ed. 1793) 396. But if a dispute as to testamentary
capacity arose, the suit would be prohibited. Egerton v. Egerton (1613) Cro.
Jac. (ed. 179) 346.
(I533) 24 Hen. VIII, c. 12, -sec. 2.
' (I534) 25 Hen. VIII, c. i9.
(535) 26 Hen. VIII, c. 1; repealed (1554) 1 & 2 Ph. & M. c. 8; revived
(1558) 1 Eliz. c. 1.
'Maitland, op. cit. supra note 18, 94 et seq.
'(545) 37 Hen. VIII, c. 17.
' (558) 1 Eliz. c. 1, allowed ecclesiastical courts concurrent jurisdiction.
' (554) 1 & 2 Ph. & M. c. 8.
"0 (I67O) 22-23 Car. II, c. 3O, secs. 1, 2, 3, failed to revive the jurisdiction of
courts Christian. Matthews v. Newby (1682) 1 Vern. 133.
' See, however, Cock v. Rambo (1686) Pa. Colonial Cas. (ed. Pennypacker,
1892) 112.
'Va. Act of Assembly, 17o5 ch. 15, reprinted in 3 Hening, Statutes at Large
(1823) 289; Avery v. Ihabitants of Tyringhain (807) 3 Mass. 16o; Kingsbury
v. Tolland (793, Conn.) i Root, 533.
'Harinon v. Dreher (843, S. C.) Speers' Eq. 87; Day v. Bolton (1831) 12
N. J. L. 206. Watson v. Garvin (1873) 54 Mo. 353, stated that the real ground
for non-interference was not that the decision of the ecclesiastical court was
final, but that the civil court had no jurisdiction at all upon purely ecclesiastical
matters; but see infra note 47.
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spiritual rights and privileges are inextricably interwoven with civil
rights. The courts generally treat the former as matters of fact, and
the general rule is that the decision of the highest church judicatory
will be accepted as conclusive. 4 4  Some cases, however, hold that it
will be received as final only if regularly arrived at.45  Others may
accept it, the implication being that whether they will or not is a matter
of judicial discretion." A few cases have held and some others seem
to indicate that the issue must be determined as any other matter of
fact.
4 7
Religious societies and churches have generally been treated as cor-
porations, but of a special nature.4  It is inevitable that, being so
closely related to the lives and feelings of the people, they should be
put on a more privileged plane than the ordinary voluntary association
" McGuire v. Trustees of St. Patrick's Cathedral (1889, Sup. Ct) 54 Hun, 2o7,
7 N. Y. Supp. 345 (right to burial in consecrated ground dependent on death in
the communion of the church); O'Donovan v. Chetard (1884) 97 Ind. 421;
Bouldin v. Alexander (1872, U. S.) I5 Wall. 131 (excommunication); German
Reformed Church v. Commonwealth (1846) 3 Pa. 282 (excommunication);
Mack v. Kime (19o7) 129 Ga. I, 58 S. E. 184; Bethany Congregational Church
v. Morse (1911) 151 Iowa, 521, 132 N. W. 14; First Presbyterian Church of
Lincoln v. First Cumberland Presbyterian Church of Lincoln (191o) 245 Ill. 74,
91 N. E. 761 (union); Hendryx v. People's United Church (igo6) 42 Wash.
336, 84 Pac. 1123; Shannon v. Frost (1842, Ky.) 3 B. Mon. 253; see (1922) 31
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"' Trustees of East Norway Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Halvorsan (18go)
42 Minn. 503, 44 N. W. 663 (expulsion; must be fair trial); see Canadian
Religious Association of North Brookfield v. Parmenter (1902) i8o Mass. 415,
421, 62 N. E. 740, 743; cf. West Koshkonong Congregation v. Ottesen (i8gi)
8o Wis. 62, 49 N. W. 24.
"Jennings v. Scarborough (1894) 56 N. J. L. 401, 28 At. 559 (discharging
a pastor by church constitutional method); Grimes' Ex'rs. v. Harmon (1871)
35 Ind. 198; Hayes v. Manning (1914) 263 Mo. I, 172 S. W. 897 (union).
' Smith v. Nelson (1846) I8 Vt. 511; and cf. State, Livingston, Prosecutor v.
Trinity Church (1883) 45 N. J. L. 230. In Watson v. Garvin, supra note 43, at
P. 377, Adams, J. said: "The civil courts are presumed to know all the law
touching property rights; and if questions of ecclesiastical law, connected with
property rights, come before them, they are compelled to decide them." The
confused variety of holdings may in many instances be reconciled in their law
by differences in the facts. The ratio decidendi seems to be in most cases: (I)
the degree to which property or civil rights will be affected by the judgment of
the church; and (2) the nature of the ecclesiastical question. If the issue is
one of excommunication it is clear that the decision of a church judicatory
would be most likely to be correct and acceptable. If the matter is one of union
of churches, as in the First Presbyterian and Cumberland Presbyterian cases,
more extensive property rights are involved and there is a greater chance of
bias influencing the view of the church courts, so that in many such cases the
courts review the action of the church. See (918) 32 HARV. L. REv. i8o.
In such cases care must be taken to distinguish between action of a legislative
and of a judicial nature. It is said, however, that the church courts may deter-
mine the extent of their own jurisdiction. O'Donovan v. Chetard, supra note
44; see Wehmer v. Fokenga (1899) 57 Neb. 510, 516, 78 N. W. 28, 33.
'Bayles, American Civil Church Law (1899) 14 POL. Scl. QUART. 511.
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or corporation. The churches and their adjuncts sustain the morale
and supply the moral vigor of the nation; to preserve respect for and
trust in them would seem in itself sufficient reason for strengthening
their hands in dealing with matters of primarily religious character.
The courts, moreover, are not fitted and can not easily fit themselves
to deal with the theological refinements and differences of each of
scores of different denominations or sects. That is a field of learning
as broad as the law, and in it only the judges of the church judica-
tories are learned. When one enters the membership of a religious
organization he is generally held to contract and agree to submit to
its laws and tenets in religious matters as determined by its proper
officers.49 It seems that very strong reasons should be required to
induce the courts to disregard this agreement and drag out the affairs
of churches for the satirical amusement of irresponsible individuals.50
SECURITY DEVICES IN MARKETING*
The discussion, in a recent case, of the limitations and requisites of
the trust receipt' and the cases dealing with the determination of
whether particular instruments are chattel mortgages or conditional
bills of sale2 lead to inquiry as to the purposes of and the distinctions
between these devices. The normal mercantile transactions are sales
on credit, with the credit period varying largely in accordance with
the needs of each industry.3  The seller is thus, ordinarily, from the
time of delivery to the buyer, in the position of a lender without
security.4 Credit departments are maintained by the merchants as a
protection against unscrupulous or financially unsound customers. How-
' State, ex rel. Watson, v. Farris (1869) 45 Mo. 183; see Wallace v. Hughes
(I909) 131 Ky. 445, 473, 115 S. W. 684, 692.
' See Ecclesiastical Trials (19o5) 8o THE NATIoN, 7; The Independence of
Church Courts (igo9) 67 THE INDEPENDENT, 1098, favors as great a degree of
freedom as possible from civil interference.
* The present approach to the subject-matter here discussed was suggested in
part by papers read by Professor Roswell F. Magill and Nathan Isaacs before the
Commercial Law section of the Association of American Law Schools at its
meeting in December, 1922. These papers, which are expected to appear in the
current volume of the CoiRN LAw QuARTRLmy, have unfortunately not been
available for exact comparison and citation; acknowledgment must therefore be
made generally in this place.
'In re A. E. Fountain, Inc. (1922, C. C. A. 2d) 282 Fed. 816.
'Heynman Co. v. Buck (1922, Mich.) 19o N. W. 631; Vander Lei v. Blakely
(1922, C. C. A. 6th) 284 Fed. 516; Petition of National Cash Register Co. (1922,
C. C. A. 6th) 283 Fed. 742.
' Steiner, The Mechaninm of Conmercial Credit (1922).
'Before such delivery, and during any period of transit, the seller has some
protection in his physical and legal control over the merchandise; but where the
sale is on credit this protection is clearly limited in extent as well as in duration,
as it covers only the case where the buyer repudiates or becomes insolvent.
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ever, where the purchased merchandise has such value in reference to
the wealth of the buyer that a considerable time extension is needed
for payment or, sometimes, where the general financial condition of
the buyer is poor,5" the lender commonly does require security, even
after delivery. 'No elimination of the risk of dealing with dishonest
persons is afforded, but there is some mitigation of it. The seller,
acting in substance as lender, may be secured either by use of the con-
ditional sale or of the sale with chattel mortgage back. A third party
financing the buyer for a particular purchase is, in import trade, gen-
erally secured by use of the trust receipt,6 although here, too, the trans-
action may take the legal form of a conditional sale or of a chattel
mortgage to such third party.7  In each case, the relationship of lender
'In this case the usual procedure is to insist on cash with order, or to ship
against sight draft.
6The trust receipt is used chiefly in importation transactions. The vendor, a
foreign merchant, receives payment from the buyer's bank and consigns the goods
to that bank. The bank allows the buyer possessi6n of the goods for specific
purposes-warehousing, reshipping, manufacture, resale, etc., as the case may be-
upon the latter's signing a trust receipt. The trust receipt transaction is one in
which the original vendor is like a mortgagor who has simultaneously conveyed
to the lender his title as security for the debt of the buyer, and his equity of
redemption to the buyer. The buyer has never held legal title and will not obtain
it, until he pays his debt. See It. re A. E. Fountain, Inc., szra note I, 823;
Frederick, The Trust Receipt as Security (1922) 22 COL. L. REV. 395, 546.
'The legal form which the transaction assumes will necessarily depend on two
factors: (i) the business purpose sought; (2) the existing legal tools which
are or can be adapted to accomplish that purpose. The seller's first need is to
sell; the second seems to be to sell to a buyer who can and will pay; the third
is to arrange the financing of the marketing, to procure capital to carry the turn-
over. It is with this last we are here primarily concerned. The seller may supply
this capital himself, and even apportion out of his fixed investment a permanent
revolving fund for that purpose. He then assumes the burden of actual financing,
in order to obtain the sale; this obviously limits the extent to which he can
expand his business to meet quick increase of demand. He may therefore himself
finance the buyer, but borrow from his banker for that purpose: he then assumes
the burden of procuring and putting his assets behind the financing, to obtain the
sale. Or the seller may be unwilling or unable, or find it unnecessary to carry this
burden in his competition for a market. Then the buyer will have to pay r-ash;
and like the seller, he may do this out of his own capital, or may borrow from
his banker for that purpose. What has been said of financing a given sales turn-
over generally, applies in detail to all or part of each stage of the turnover: the
period of manufacture or assemblage or other procurement of goods by a seller;
the period of transportation from seller to buyer; the period of realization by the
buyer who buys for resale. By cash with order the buyer may carry the financing
of all three stages; by letter of credit calling for cash against documents in the
seller's market, he carries the last two; by cash against sight draft in the buyer's
market, he carries only the last; by getting delivery on credit terms long enough
to cover his own resale, he carries none at all. When the money-creditor in the
operation, be it seller, seller's banker, or buyer's banker, lends on the general credit
of the borrower, as on open account, or on unsecured note, or acceptance, the legal
situation is relatively clear. But where the creditor attempts to keep, during the
whole or part of the period of financing, security-rights in the specific merchandise
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and borrower exists, with possession of the merchandise in the bor-
rower and with security lien or title in the lender.8  The consignment
transaction, though of great importance in marketing, is not a security
device to secure a debt. The relationship created is that of principal
and agent. The very reason for employing the consignment is that,
at the time, no buyer has been discovered; the consignee, being both
by location and by trade better able to secure a buyer, is therefore
empowered to transfer title within the limits of the consignment
arrangement, but without assuming in advance the duty to pay the
price.9  The conditional sale to a dealer, with privilege and power
to resell, differs from the consignment in this vital particular. The
pledge, the chattel mortgage to secure old debts, and the true lease
are rarely direct marketing devices"0 and will not be considered in this
discussion; so far as an apparent lease is in substance a conditional
sale disguised to defeat recording acts, it appears to be treated by
court and legislature according to its true nature and function.
Possession is so broadly accepted as a badge of ownership that a
being marketed, the legal problems become more intricate. Even here, as between
buyer and seller direct, the situation has been worked out with some completeness.
Where, however, the banker intervenes, as a lender to either buyer or seller,
unsettled difficulties are met at once. The difficulty is that legal security-instru-
ments designed for two-party use are being used in three-party transactions.
Thus, whether the banker discounts the seller's draft against bill of lading; or
takes the documents against payment or acceptance under a letter of credit, releas-
ing them to the buyer against trust receipt, after transportation; or advances the
buyer funds to meet the seller's sight draft, taking from the buyer a conditional
sale note and contract-in each case the banker is claiming all the seller's rights
in the goods, but denying the assumption of any of the seller's obligations, and is
interested in holding his rights solely as security for the payment of the advances
made; but to this separation of the merchandizing and financing elements of
marketing the legal tools have not yet been wholly adjusted. The key to a sound
solution of the problems that arise is believed to lie largely in stressing the banker's
pure security purpose, and his lack of connection with the merchandizing proper,
no undue weight being given to the surface-form of transaction. Cf. the approach
suggested in note 6.
" The conflict between the title and lien theories of the chattel mortgage are
summarized in I I C. J. 398.
' So far as debt and security-that is, financing the marketing process-enter into
the consignment, they do so by way of advance of money by, and pledge of the
merchandise to, the consignee: the normal process of financing by the seller is
reversed. Thus the consignment process is typical of a centralized market where
sellers are relatively weak financially, and the marketing agent of a great body of
sellers is relatively strong, as in farmers' shipments to commission men. Even in
a del credere consignment the consignee assumes no duty to pay the price until
his sale is made.
"0 The chattel mortgage is occasionally used in close connection with marketing
operations, as where operating capital is advanced to a manufacturer by banker
or selling agent on chattel mortgage of inventory, the goods as manufactured
being delivered to a warehouse controlled bona fide by the lender, and orders being
filled from the stock in such warehouse; but on any close analysis such a proce-
dure seems to be more truly a financing of manufacture than of marketing.
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bona fide creditor of or purchaser from the possessor of personalty
is to some extent protected from the claims of security title or lien
holders. Chattel mortgages must almost universally be filed or
recorded" to be effective against uninformed third parties where the
mortgagor retains possession of the merchandise. 12  Chattel mortgages
leaving the mortgagor in possession, with power to sell the chattel for
his own benefit, are void against creditors of the mortgagorY.3  Twenty-
nine states require recordation of conditional sales and a few others
interpret recordation statutes to include conditional sales.' 4 But else-
where the conditional sale is good without recordation. The statutes
generally distinguish between the rights of creditors of conditional
buyers and chattel mortgagors and those of purchasers from them,
giving greater protection to the creditors. A distinction is now being
made in some jurisdictions between lien and general creditors and
protection is tendered only the lien creditors;'5 some states also dis-
tinguish between subsequent creditors and those who had become such
before a chattel mortgage. Where goods are delivered under a condi-
tional sale contract and the seller consents that thd buyer resell them
prior to the performance of the condition, the reservation is void
against purchasers from the buyer for value in the ordinary course
of business, but not as against creditors in some jurisdictions16 Results
similar to those just stated are obtained under trust receipts, which,
so far as passed on by courts, are valid without recordation except in
a few jurisdictions.1 7  The trust receipt is limited in fact and inten-
tion to protection against the creditors of the borrower. Where bills
of lading and warehouse receipts are turned over to the importer in
return for trust receipts, they should conform to the requirements for
""Record" will be used in this comment to cover both filing and recordation.
Schouler, Personal Property (5th ed. 1918) sec. 425. The exact definition of
third parties protected, and to a lesser extent the manner of their protection,
varies somewhat among the states.
13ii C. J. 571.
4Uniform Conditional Sales Act, sec. 5, g Uniform Laws Ann. 6. See (1919)
33 HARv. L. REv. 321; (1922) 22 CoL. L. REv. 183; Bogert, The Proposed
Uniform Conditional Sales Act (1917) 3 CORN. L. QUART. 2.
"Uniform Conditional Sales Act, supra note 14; II C. J. 515.
12 Uniform Laws Ann. 15; L. R. A. 1917 B, 661, note. This, the current form
of statement of the rule, is almost self-contradictory and rests on confused
thinking; it would have point as against creditors of the conditional vendee, or
in the case where, after notice served, the conditional vendor is claiming the unpaid
price from the sub-purchaser, adversely to the conditional vendee. But even
though the reservation were valid, the sub-purchaser would take title under sale
by the owner's agent for the purpose of selling.
7 Frederick, op. cit. supra note 6, 405; In re Bettman-Johnson Co. (1918, C. C. A.
6th) 250 Fed. 657 (invalid) ; It re Richheiner (1915, C. C. A. 7th) 221 Fed. 16
(invalid). The Connecticut Court held the trust receipt transaction to be a condi-
tional sale, but this was before the statute requiring the recording of conditional
sales, which was passed in 1893. New Haven Wire Co. Cases (7888) 57 Conn.
-352, 18 At]. 266; Conn. Gen. Sts. I918,.sec. 4744.
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non-negotiable instruments of this character, if the lender is to be pro-
tected from the claims of innocent pledgees.'8 The protection of the
consignor in consignment transactions against unauthorized transfer
of the chattels is restricted in a few states by factors' acts.19 Where
there has been a representation of ownership, made with the intention
that an innocent person, believing it, would act in reliance upon it,
the principle of estoppel is generally brought into use and the parties
making such representation are held to be estopped to deny the
apparent ownership. The principle of estoppel when used in this
connection is similar in aim to the British statute of Reputed Owner-
ship.2' A consideration of the conflict of laws arising from the statutes
involved above requires separate treatment.
The remedies afforded by use of the security devices vary. After
default, the lender in each of these transactions may recover possession
either from the borrower having the chattel or, subject to the limita-
tions already indicated, from a third party in possession.21 Trover is
maintainable by the lender under a valid conditional sale against the
borrower or holders through him, even as to proceeds, so long as they
are identifiable; under the trust receipt, trover can be maintained
against the borrower or his creditors. 2  The usual method of recovery
" (1922) 3 Uniform Laws Ann. sec. 41, "Warehouse Receipts." (1922) 4
Uniform Laws Ann, sec. 32, "Bills of Lading." This covers, of course, only
pledges of the documents.
"Mass. Gen. Laws, 1921, cL. 1O4; N. Y. Cons. Laws, i9og, ch. 45, sec. 43; Md.
Ann. Code, 1911, art II; R. I. Gen. Laws, 19o9, ch. 187; Pa. Sts. I92O, sec.
1177-8; Me. Rev. Sts. 1916, ch. 39; Ohio Gen. Ann. Code 1921, ch. 836o-64.
Transfers for antecedent debts of the factor, however, are not protected. See
Frederick, op. cit. supra note 6, 549. A related rule obtains wherever Sales Act sec.
20 (4) or Bills of Lading Act sec. 4o(d) has been adopted; under some circum-
stances these sections permit a buyer who has without honoring the draft for the
price obtained possession of a bill of lading to transfer either the bill or the relative
goods free of the seller's claims.
Elkus and Glenn, Secret Liens and Reputed Omrnwrship (191o). See Frederick,
op. cit. supra note 6; Williston, Sales (1909) 567.
"Riley v. Dillon & Pennell (igo6) 148 Ala. 283, 41 So. 768 (conditional sale);
Younag v. Salley (1904) 83 Miss. 362, 35 So. 571 (conditional sale) ; Procton v.
Tilton (i889) 65 N. H. 3, 17 AtI. 638 (conditional sale, peaceful seizure);
Lazarovitch v. Tatilbom (19o7) 1O3 Me. 285, 69 Atl. 275 (conditional; sale by
assignee of lender) ; Brount v. Billington (2894) 163 Pa. 76, 29 Atl. 904 (trust
receipt, bailment theory) ; Canadian Bank v. Bauwn (1898) 187 Pa. 48, 4o AtI. 975
(trust receipt, bailment theory) ; Roth v. Smith (914, C. C. A. 3d) 215 Fed. 82
(trust receipt) ; It re Reboulin. Fils (29o8, D. N. J.) 165 Fed. 245 (trust receipt) ;
It re Marks .(95, C. C. A. 2d) 222 Fed. 52 (trust receipt, necessary to trace
particular fund); Century Throwing Co. v. Muller (1912, C. C. A. 3d) 197 Fed.
252 (trust receipt, against special statutory lienholder); First Nat. Bank of
Barnesville v. St. Aithony Elevator Co. (2908) 103 Minn. 82, 114 N. W. 265
(chattel mortgage); Shorter v. Dail (1913) 122 Md. IOI, 89 At. 329 (chattel
mortgage).
' Watson v. Goodno (1894) 66 Vt. 229, 28 Ati. 987 (conditional sale) ; Lorain
Steel Co. v. Norfolk & B. St. Ry. (195o) 187 Mass. 500, 73 N. E. 646 (conditional
COMMENTS
for the chattel mortgagee is foreclosure with a subsequent sale.2 3 The
lender under the chattel mortgage is entitled only to the amount secured
with interest. 4 But by present probable weight of authority the con-
ditional seller may retain installments paid before default, after recovery
of the chattel.2 5  The proposed Uniform Conditional Sales Act, by
redemption and compulsory resale provisions assures to a conditional
buyer, who has paid half the purchase price the surplus secured by
the seller over the sums due him.21 Where the lender on chattel mort-
gage or trust receipt receives less than the amount secured by the
sale of the chattel, the borrower is liable for the balance; but generally
a retaking of conditionally sold merchandise is considered as a rescis-
sion of the contract and the conditional seller can therefore not recover
a balance due." It seems obvious that satisfaction obtained by the
use of any remedy is a bar to further recoicery. But there is a square
conflict of authority as to whether merely bringing suit for so much
of the purchase price as is still unpaid will not of itself vest full title
in a conditional buyer; the proposed uniform act wisely follows the
negative view, thus rendering the seller's interest in law what it is in
fact-an interest retained to secure a debt 2  The risk of physical
destruction, the risk of fall in value and opportunity for profit are
sale). See Dowes v. Nat. Exchange Bank (1875) 91 U. S. 618 (trust receipt) ;
So Flour & Gr. Co. v. Central Texas Exchange Bank (1921) 27 Ga. App. 524,
iog S. E. 685 (trust receipt) ; In re Mulligan. (19o2, D. Mass.) 116 Fed. 715,
717; Frederick, op. cit. supra note 6, 554.
" Templeton v. Lloyd (1911) 59 Or. 52, 115 Pac. io68 (foreclosure held neces-
sary to cut off mortgagor's title) ; Budweiser Brewing Co. v. Capparelli" (1896
City Ct) 38 N. Y. Supp. 972; Gavin v. Matthews (igio) 152 N. C. 195, 67 S. E.
478; Furman v. Menick (1915, Sup. Ct) 154 N. Y. Supp. 1oo; see (192o) 29
YALE LAw JOURNAL, 683.
"Kinkead v. Peet (1911) I53 Iowa, 199, 132 N. W. io95 (right of redemption,
mortgagor); Hughes v. Harlam (19ol) 166 N. Y. 427, 6o N. E. 22 (same).2 Rayfield v. Van Meter (1898) 120 Calif. 416, 52 Pac. 666; Mohler v. Guest
Piano Co. (1919) 186 Iowa, I61, 172 N. W. 302; Niman v. Story & Clark Piano
Co. (1921) 213 Mich. 397, I8I N. W. 1017; Black ford v. Neaves (1922, Ariz.)
205 Pac. 587; contra: Puffer v. Lucas (1893) 112 N. C. 377, 17 S. E. I74; Enter-
prise Distr. Corp. v. Zalk n (1922, Ga.) H13 S. E. 409. See Williston, op. cit.
supra note 20, sec. 579.
'2 Uniform Laws Ann. secs. 17-21. Similarly, even under the pending amend-
ment in New York, Senate Bill No. 320, Jan. 24, 1923.
Barchard v. Kohn (1895) 157 Ill. 579, 41 N. E. 902 (chattel mortgage);
see Renta v. Crosby (1918) IOS S. C. 431, 94 S. E. 1053; Rodgers v. Whitehead
(1921, Miss.) 89 So. 799 (conditional sale); Charavay & Bodvin v. York Silk
Mfg. Co. (igog, S. D. N. Y.) 17o Fed. 819 (trust receipt); II C. J. 716; Willis-
ton, op. cit. supra note 2o, sec. 579; 35 Cyc. 705.
(I92o) 8 CALIF. L. REv. 192; see Schmidt v. Ackert (I918) 231 Mass. 330,
121 N. E. 24 (conditional seller's repossession of goods by replevin bar to collec-
tion of full price) ; Fuller v. Eames (1896) io8 Ala. 464, 19 So. 366 (attachment
by conditional seller estopped him from bringing detinue); 2 Uniform Laws Ann.
(1922) 36; 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 191.
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usually upon the borrower in these transactions ;29 as is proper, since
the debt remains regardless of destruction of the security and the
lender's interest is in fact limited to the amount of the debt. The
lender is generally held to have an insurable interest in the goods to
the extent of the debt; but the borrower usually pays any premium
for insurance with the lender as beneficiary 03 The consignment trans-
action is of course governed in these matters by the rules of bailment
and agency. The variations both in decisions, in the language of
statutory changes, and in the interpretation of the statutes are so wide
that the foregoing statements must be taken as general, without indi-
cation of the nicer points of difference among the states. But it is
safe to say that the course of legal development for the past century
has been and will continue to be in the direction .of recognizing, sepa-
rating, and perfecting the 'security interest in its security function,
and as distinct from the sale proper.
In practice, the choice of a security device is now largely governed
by the custom of each industry and business. In any given situation,
it is largely part of the routine to use a particular method for securing
the amount advanced in goods or cash. The trust receipt is limited
in scope, but it is very effective within its limits. 31 There is a tendency
to frown upon it as a transaction in which the bank concerned really
engages in merchandizing and which is therefore not part of the reg-
ular banking business. This tendency should be tempered with a real-
ization that modern business needs require that financially sound
merchants receive just such aid from their bankers. The trust receipt
is not intended to do away with the normal credit risk a lender assumes.
nor to give property rights which will serve in substitution for a bor-
rower's general credit standing; but only to afford some additional
specific security for each loan. This security is necessarily limited in
character, but is, for that reason, not to be condemned, but rather to
be relied on only as an accessory to the borrower's general and unse-
cured engagement. And what is thus true of the trust receipt is true
of every other device here discussed. No security device, save the
pledge of negotiable securities, can eliminate the credit risk or losses
consequent upon giving credit to a dishonest or financially unsound
borrower. The "chattel mortgage back" transaction seems at first to
offer more valuable protection than the conditional sale, since the chat-
tel mortgagor is liable to the chattel mortgagee for any part of the
amount secured not realized by the sale of the chattel. The chattel
(1922) 22 CoL. L. REv. 183; ii C. J. 561; Williston, op. cit. supra note 2o,
sees. 303, 304, 334, 335. 2 Uniform Laws Ann. sec. 27; I Uniform Laws Ann. sec.
22 (a).
' Joyce, Insurance (2d ed. 1917) secs. 982, 1O26.
'Peoples' Nat. Bk. of Boston v. Madholland (1916) 224 Mass. 491, 113 N. E.
365, (1917) 228 Mass. 152, 117 N. E. 46; In re A. Fountain Inc. supra note i;
Williston, The Progress of the Law, I919-I92O (1921) 34 HARV. L. REv. 741,
758-760.
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mortgage, however, has disadvantages. It is recorded by the mercan-
tile agencies in the credit records and reports upon which prospective
creditors place so much reliance and it is regarded as an indication of
financial weakness, perhaps because a blanket chattel mortgage is so
often used by a distressed borrower primarily to give additional secur-
ity for old advances. It also almost universally requires recordation,
which delays considerably the operation of arranging credit. The use
of devices technically giving the mortgagee legal possession, such as
the placing of signs with the mortgagee's name on the merchandise and
the segregation of the goods, indicate the dislike of the necessity of
recordation. The conditional sale is not viewed with suspicion by the
credit authorities, but it, too, quite generally'needs recordation. Where
conditional sales do not require recordation, that fact is often sufficient
to result in the use of that device. The universal acceptance of the
proposed uniform laws would aid in clearly determining the fields to
which each of the security methods is best fitted.
CONSIDERATION FOR PROMISES BY A GRATUITOUS BAILEE
The New York Court of Appeals has just held in Siegel v. Spear
& Co. (1923) 68 N. Y. L. Jour. 1847, that a gratuitous bailee is bound
to pay damages for breach of his promise to effect insurance on the
articles in his care. The plaintiff was a purchaser of furniture on the
installment plan, the defendant being the seller with a chattel mortgage
as security. For the convenience of the plaintiff, the defendant under-
took to store the furniture free of charge during the summer and
promised to have it insured for the plaintiff's benefit, the cost thereof
to be paid later by the plaintiff. The furniture was burned without
having been insured.
The court held that the surrender of possession of the goods was a
sufficient consideration for the promise, and on this ground distin-
guished several cases in which promises to insure were held to be with-
out consideration and void.' This distinction has been thought to be
of little weight, inasmuch as the surrender of possession in the gratu-
itous bailment is not exchanged for the defendant's promise to insure.2
Thus in 'Thorne v. Deas (I o, N. Y.) 4 Johns. 84, one of two joint owners of
a vessel promised the other to have it insured. He failed to keep his promise,
and the vessel was lost at sea. In Brawm v. Lyford (19o7) 103 Me. 362, 69 Atl.
54, a vendor promised his vendee to have certain insurance policies then in the
vendor's possession properly assigned to the vendee. The promise was not kept,
and later the buildings were burned. In these cases there was no bailment of
goods.
'Thus Professor Williston, Contracts (192o) sec. 138, says: "Allowing another
to act as a gratuitous agent, bailee, or trustee, is a detriment which may support
the promise of the agent, bailee, or trustee. The difficulty, however, is that the
parties ordinarily in a gratuitous transaction do not in fact exchange the promise
for this permission."
YALE LAW JOURNAL
In all these cases alike there was action or forbearance in reliance
upon the promise, fully as important in character as any mere sur-
render of possession. Of course, a gratuitous bailee has certain
duties in the absence of any promise, the bailee being suable in an
action of tort. The bailee has been said to be liable only for a mis-
feasance, not for a nonfeasance. This distinction is not worth much
either, 3 because negligence is usually nonfeasance; and yet a bailee is
liable for negligence causing injury to the property. He must, of
course, have taken the article into his possession, for otherwise he
does not become a bailee. It has sometimes been believed that a gra-
tuitous bailee's duties are not contractual and that they cannot be
increased by mere promissory words ;4 but there is ample authority in
support of the contrary view.'
See the remarks of Collins, L. J., in Turner v. Stallibrass [1898] 1 Q. B. 56, 59.
42 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (19o6) 49: "Upon principle the
distinction appears to be this: The mandatary is liable for a misfeasance of the
mandate if the right of action can be brought within the principle of actions for
negligence, but not otherwise . . . . the right of action for negligence is limited
to situations where damage is negligently done to person or property. It follows
that the right of action for misfeasance on the part of a mandatary is limited to
situations where his misfeasance results in physical hurt or damage to property.
If I deliver my liquors to a man to convey from one place to another and he is to
do it for nothing, he will be liable for breaking one of the casks if he is chargeable
with negligence. Coggs v. Bernard (703, K. B.) 2 Ld. Raym. 9o9. So a carrier
of passengers is liable for a negligent injury to a passenger, although the latter is
being conveyed without compensation." Williston, loc. cit. sapra note 2: "The
discussions in regard to this question show that the true nature of the liability is
not contractual, for, if it were, the .only question would be-what was the defen-
dant's promise."
'In Wilkinson v. Coverdale (793) I Esp. 75, a buyer sued the seller for breach
of a promise to have certain existing insurance transferred to the buyer, the seller
having brought about a defective transfer. Lord Kenyon thought that the case
fell within the "misfeasance" doctrine and allowed the case to go to the jury.
In Whitehead v. Greetham (1825, C. P.) 2 Bing. 464, the plaintiff deposited ;7oo
with the defendant and the latter promised to buy therewith a well-secured
annuity. The defendant was adjudged to pay damages for buying an annuity that
failed through insolvency. In Robinson v. Threadgill (851) 35 N. C. 39,
an action was sustained for breach of a gratuitous promise by the defendant to
collect notes put into his possession by the plaintiff. See also Hart v. Miles
(1858) 4 C. B. (N. s.) 571; McCauley v. Davidson (1865) 1o Minn. 418; Clark v.
Gaylord (1856) 24 Conn. 484. In Car? v. Maine Central Ry. (917) 78 N. H.
402, 1o2 At. 532, the defendant promised that if the plaintiff would execute the
necessary papers the defendant would forward them to the Interstate Commerce
Commission in time for the allowance of a rebate. For breach of this promise the
court sustained "Case for negligence." The court said that the declaration
"sounds in tort"; but in fact the only "tort" committed was that for which
special assumpsit was invented-the breach of an express promise relied on by
the plaintiff.
Sir William Anson (Contracts, Corbin's ed. 1919, sec. 133) agrees entirely with
the instant decision. He recognizes that the action must be ex contractu and
suggests that such cases are exceptions to the "universal application" of the
English doctrine of consideration. It is believed, however, that the "doctrine"
should be so expanded in its statement as to include such "exceptions."
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In the instant case the defendant's duty can be regarded as con-
tractual only. A mere gratuitous bailee is under no duty to insure.
It is believed that the decision is sound, but that it must rest upon the
principle that certain types of reliance upon a promise make it binding
without any other consideration. A surrender of possession is one
of these types, but the principle should not be restricted to cases of
bailment of goods.6
A. L. C.
EFFECT OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON EQUITABLE MORTGAGE
Despite the.common occurrence of mortgage transactions, the courts
are still confused as to what legal relations arise from a mortgage.'
Confusion increases, moreover, when a mortgage transaction involves
other questions of law.
In the case of Pratt v. Pratt (1922, Wash.) 2o9 Pac. 535, a son
purchased land taking title in the name of his father by a deed absolute
on its face. In fact the deed was given as security for a debt not evi-
denced by writing, owing from the son to the father. The statute
of limitations for such a debt in Washington is three years. The father,
after the debt was barred, brought suit against the son's widow, to
have the deed declared a mortgage and foreclosed. It was held (four
judges dissenting) first, that the conveyance was intended as security
for a debt and hence that the deed should be considered as a mortgage;
secondly, since.a mortgage is merely security for a debt, it is a mere
incident thereof and therefore, the debt being barred, the mortgage is
barred also. The court therefore denied any relief to the plaintiff.
The case presents a threefold complication: (I) a deed absolute
intended as a mortgage; (2) a debt barred by the statute of limitations;
and (3) relief sought by the mortgagee.
The instant case is in accord with the general rule, both in jurisdic-
tions where a mortgage conveys legal title and in those states where it
creates merely a lien, that a deed absolute on its face will be declared
to be a mortgage2 if there is clear and convincing evidence3 that the par-
'It might well include Thorne v. Deas and Brawn v. Lyford, supra. See Anson,
op. cit. supra note 5, sec. 127, note I. Indeed, in the present case the court says of
Thorne v. Dear: "Whether or not we would feel bound to follow it today must
be left open until the question comes properly before us."
'Lloyd, Mortgages-The Genesis of The Lien Theory (1923) 32 YALE LAw
JOURNAL, 233.
*Title states: Linkeinann v. Knepper (1907) 226 Ill. 473, So N. E. l09;
Cullen v. Carey (1886) 146 Mass. 50, 15 N. E. 131. Lien states: DeLeonis v.
Walsh (19o3) i4O Calif. 175, 73 Pac. 823; Teal v. Scandinavian-Aimerican Bank
(911) 114 Minn. 435, 131 N. W. 486; 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4 th
ed. 1918) 2840; see L. P. A. 1916 B, i8-6io, note.
33 Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 2, 2846, note; (1913) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
i85.
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ties intended it to be security for a debt. But even in most lien states, it
is generally held that such a deed passes legal title to the land.4 Under
such a deed the mortgagee has everywhere the legal power to pass an
absolute fee to a bona fide purchaser without notice of the real char-
acter of the deed, and thereby cut off the mortgagor's right of redemp-
tion.5
When, as in the instant case, the conveyance is made by a third
person to the creditor at the request of the debtor and with the assent
of the creditor, the result is the same as when the debtor conveys
directly to the creditor.
6
In determining the effect upon a mortgage of the barring of the
debt by the statute of limitations, "title" states and "lien" states must
be considered separately.7  Title states almost unanimously hold that
although the debt is barred, the mortgagee may recover on the mort-
gage" The lien states however are in conflict. Some hold that there
are two remedies: one on the mortgage and one on the debt. The
effect then is the same as in the title states.9 Other lien states carry
the underlying theory to its logical conclusion, holding that, since the
mortgage is a security for a debt, it is incidental to it, and consequently
'Ferguson v. Boyd (19o7) 169 Ind. 537, 81 N. E. 71; Lake v. Weaver (i9o8,
N. J. Eq.) 7o Atl. 81; Lindberg v. Thomas (i9o8) 137 Iowa, 48, 114 N. W. 562;
I Jones, Mortgages (7th ed. 1915) sec. 244. There are some jurisdictions, how-
ever, which reach a different conclusion. Flynn v. Holmes (i9o6) 145 Mich. 6o6,
io8 N. W. 685; Shirey v. All Night and Day Bank (1913) 166 Calif. 50, 134 Pac.
Iooi (statutory; Calif. Civ. Code, secs. 2888, 2924). See 3 Tiffany, Real Property
(192o) 2382. In Washington the question has not yet been definitely decided.
See the dissenting opinion in the instant case, at p. 537. It seems, in accordance
with the view laid down in this opinion, that many of the cases which hold that
legal title does not pass, were decided in jurisdictions where equitable defenses
could be set up, and therefore do not squarely raise the point. In the principal
case there is a further reason for holding that title was in the mortgagee, since
the conveyance was taken from a third person and legal title was never in the
actual mortgagor.
'Pancake v. Cauff man (1886) 114 Pa. 113, 7 Atl. 67; Harrington v. Butte &
Superior Copper Co. (1916) 52 Mont. 263, 157 Pac. 181; 3 Tiffany, op. cit. supra
note 4, 2390. By so doing the mortgagee would, of course, render himself liable
to the mortgagor. Sheldon v. Bradley (1870) 37 Conn. 324; Van Heuvel v.
Long (1917) 2oo Ala. 27, 75 So. 339. By the weight of authority the mortgagor
may, at his election, claim the actual value of the land or the proceeds. See 3
Tiffany, op. cit. supra note 4, 2390; (1913) 13 COL. L. REv. 442.
3 Tiffany, op. cit. supra note 4, 2391, and cases there cited.
SNoTEs (1903) 16 HARv. L. REv. 445; NoTEs (1918) 2 MINN. L. REV. 218.
'Belknap v. Gleason (1836) I1 Conn. i6o; Norton v. Palmer (1886) 142 Mass.
433, 8 N. E. 346. It is usually said that the statute of limitations bars the
remedy and not the right. In the case of a debt secured by a mortgage there
are two remedies; one on the debt and one on the mortgage. One of these
may be barred and the other still exist.
'Hulbert v. Clark (i89i) 128 N. Y. 295, 28 N. E. 638; Michigan Inls. Co. v.
Brown (1863) 11 Mich. 265; 2 Wood, Limitations (4th ed. 1916) 1037 et seq;
3 Tiffany, op. cit. supra note 4, 2620.
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when the debt is barred the mortgage also is barred.10 This view, how-
ever, is accompanied by the rule that if the debt is revived the mort-
gage will be incidentally resuscitated.:1 This, of course, cannot be
done to the prejudice of a subsequent grantee.12
The instant case was decided in a lien state where it is held that a
mortgage is extinguished when the debt for which it is security is
barred. But the facts of this case are distinguishable from the usual
situation in which the secured debt is barred, and therefore require
different treatment. It does not involve an ordinary mortgage but
a deed absolute intended as a mortgage. As the dissenting opinion
points out, title had passed to the mortgagee. The situation seems
similar to that of a mortgage in a title state, where the remedy on the
mortgage is not barred merely because the debt is barred.
By the weight of authority even in the lien states a court of equity
will not give relief to a mortgagor who seeks the cancellation of a mort-
gage on the ground that the debt is barred, unless payment of the debt
is tendered. 13  The reason is that the debt is morally due and he who
seeks equity must do equity. If this is true with respect to the ordi-
nary mortgage, a fortiori it should be true of the deed absolute which
was intended as a mortgage,'4 for in the latter case legal title has
" Tennant v. Hulet (1917) 65 Ind. App. 24, 116 N. E. 748; George v. Butler
(i9oi) 26 Wash. 456, 67 Pac. 263. The same result is reached by statute in a
few states, notably California and Iowa. Faxon v. All Persons, etc. (1913) 166
Calif. 707, 137 Pac. gig; Fitzgerald v. Flanagan (1912) 155 Iowa, 217, 135 N, W.
738. See 2 Wood, op. cit. supra note 9, 1037. By virtue of the Bankruptcy Act
a discharge of a debt by bankruptcy proceedings does not affect the mortgage
security. Bankruptcy Act, Act of July I, 1898 (3o Stat. at L. 544, 564); 3
Remington, Bankruptcy (2d ed. 1915) sec. 2668.
'Schmucker v. Sibert (1877) i Kan. 1O4; see M/iurphy v. Coates (88) 33
N. J. Eq. 424.
'New York Life Ins. Co. v. Covert (1859 N. Y.) 29 Barb. 435; see Schmucker
v. Sibert, supra note ii.
"3Lake v. Weaver, supra note 4; Tracy v. Wheeler (19o6) 15 N. D. 248, 249,
iO7 N. W. 68; Chapman v. Hicks (1919) 41 Calif. App. 158, 182 Pac. 336; see
(915) 15 Co. L. REv. 790; 3 Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 2, sec. 1196. "Equity
and good conscience require that she should pay the debt secured by the mortgage
as a condition to its cancellation. The maxim 'that he who seeks equity must
do equity' voices a just and universal rule in determining the equitable rights of
suitors, and should always be applied in cases like this ..... The plaintiff seeks
equity. They must do equity. Every man should pay his just debts. It is right
that he should do so. The fact that he may not be coerced to discharge them
by legal means affects only the legal character of his obligation. It does not
alter the primary fact that he owes an obligation which in equity and good
conscience he should pay." Tracy v. Wheeler, supra. Faxon v. All Personzs,
supra note 1o, modified this general rule in holding that a purchaser from such
a mortgagor may have the mortgage cancelled because there is no debt morally
due from him. See NoTEs (1922) 22 Cor. L. REV. 451.
4 Gallagher v. Giddings (1891) 33 Neb. 222, 49 N. W. 1126; Doris v. Story
(i9o5) 122 Ga. 611, 50 S. E. 348; Lake v. Weaver, supra note 4; Sturdivant v.
McCorley (9o7) 83 Ark. 278, 103 S. W. 732. "In other words, the statute of
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passed.' 5 The proper action in such a case is not merely to cancel
the mortgage, but first to have the deed declared to be a mortgage and
then to have the mortgage cancelled. The equitable remedy sought in
the latter case is greater than that sought in the ordinary mortgage
case, and if equity will not grant relief in the first instance unless pay-
ment is tendered, it surely should not do so in the second.
In the instant case however it is not the mortgagor who seeks relief,
but the mortgagee who asks that equity be done him. It does not
necessarily follow from the decision, however, that the plaintiff has
no interest whatsoever in the land. By the weight of authority an
action by the mortgagor to quiet title will not be sustained unless ie
tenders payment of the amount of the barred debt."
The Privy Council held, in the recent case of Grand Trunk Ry. v.
The King [19221 39 T. L. R. 69, that the value of the stock of a going
concern is measured only by its return, affirming the majority judg-
ment of an arbitration tribunal from which Mr. William Howard Taft
dissented, that for purposes of acquisition by the Canadian Govern-
ment the value of the physical assets of the railway was not admissible
as evidence in determining, the value of the preferred and common
stock of the road. Mr. Taft was perhaps influenced by the fact that
some of the Grand Trunk's tracks were in the United States, and the
fact that by legislation this country is committed to the physical val-
uation of railways for purposes of rate-making.' Although physical
valuation may be used in fixing rates, the Privy Council thought that
it ought not to be considered in determining what securities are worth-
that being properly determined only by capitalizing the income
realized on the securities.
limitations as to mortgages does not apply with full force to equitable mortgages
of this kind evidenced by absolute deeds without any written defeasances."
Sturdivant v. McCorley, supra at p. 279
, 
1O3 S. W. at p. 733.
'Supra note 4.
"Supra notes 13 and 14. Moreover, the mortgagor's right to quiet title or
redeem may be lost by laches. Miller v. Sinith (189o) 44 Minn. 127, 46 N. W.
324; Green v. Capps (1892) 142 Ill. 286, 31 N. E. 597. See (1923) 71 U. PA. L.
REV. 284.
'Transportation Act, 192o, Act of February 28, 192o (41 Stat. at L. 456, 488).
As to the importance of physical valuation in rate-making by American courts, see
Artaud, A Review of the Federal Valuation of Railroads (1922) 32 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 37; CoMMENs (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 392, note IO.
